FY14 STUDY TORS

USAF Scientific Advisory Board
Defense of USAF Forward Bases
Terms of Reference

Background
Protection of forward US Air Force Bases is a growing concern. In an A2AD environment, Air Force Bases in critical theaters, such as within the PACOM Area of Responsibility, may be threatened by a sophisticated adversary. Advanced land attack cruise missiles and theater or medium range ballistic missiles are of specific concern and may not be adequately addressed by current missile defense systems. Even in permissive environments, forward Air Force bases may also be threatened by shorter range systems employed by local adversaries such as non-state actors or guerrilla forces using mortars, IEDs, small aircraft, or UAVs. Defending against these threats is essential to USAF participation in Air Sea Battle, expeditionary operations, and forward deployed operations.

Charter
This study will:
  • Identify the threat to USAF forward bases, including runways, platforms, shelters, C2, and critical infrastructure (e.g., communications, power, fuel, water). Prioritize identified vulnerabilities.
  • Review existing assessments of the capability of DoD defensive systems to protect USAF bases, including the shot doctrine and command and control required to deconflict with ongoing USAF operations.
  • Assess current capabilities and plans to harden relevant Air Force facilities and infrastructure or otherwise reduce their vulnerability e.g., through mobility, agility, and rapid recovery. Include protection of aircraft parked in the open.
  • Assess innovative ways to use existing or advanced technologies to enhance base defense, for example by using obscurants to increase threat weapon CEP or defeat BDA assessments.
  • Identify Air Force relevant technologies which could be used to provide improved and balanced defense of USAF bases via an inner layer defense or enhanced base survivability.
  • Define an Air Force relevant S&T roadmap to address gaps in base protection and hardening systems.
  • Determine the potential effectiveness, affordability, transportability, survivability, and sustainability of candidate solutions.
Study Products
Briefing to SAF/OS & AF/CC in July 2014. Publish report in May 2015.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAF Scientific Advisory Board
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
Terms of Reference

Background
Within the DoD, Nuclear Command and Control (NC3) is a part of a larger set of systems referred to as the National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC). NLCC includes Presidential National Voice Conferencing, NC3, and Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government communications. The USAF is responsible for about 70% of the NC3 system. Modernization of the system was begun after a recent in-depth review. That modernization has resulted in a system which is a hybrid of older and newer elements. In addition, some elements of the underlying network architecture have been transitioned by DISA and now rely on Internet Protocol (IP) based architectures. The new system will be key to maintaining connectivity at the National senior leader level in times of crisis and to the ability of the nation to exercise the bomber and ICBM legs of the triad. Understanding the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the new system, including performance during a nuclear event, cyber mission assurance of the system and its underlying architecture, and the sustainment of the system are all critical to the nation's confidence in its nuclear deterrent.

Charter
The study will:
  • Identify and characterize the existing elements of the NC3 system, their criticality, and their current state of performance. Include in the effort those platforms (bomber and ICBM) executed and supported via the NC3 architecture.
  • Review the upgrade plan for the system and any auxiliary infrastructure elements including activities to date and future efforts. Characterize the ability of the upgraded system to meet performance, reliability, and availability needs at each stage in the system's evolution.
  • Review efforts to date to understand the networks and pathways which constitute the NC3 system and assess the ability to regularly test and monitor the complete system. Include in that review the underlying network architecture and any components of that architecture which have transitioned to an IP-based architecture.
  • Assess the sustainment plan for the NC3 system and address any identified shortcomings which would impact NC3 capability..
  • Examine robustness of the upgraded system in a nuclear environment.
  • Evaluate the ability to maintain mission assurance from a cyber-perspective and ways of mitigating any potential shortfalls. Include any risks associated with DISA changes to the underlying network architecture.
  • Recommend investments including S&T to redress any identified deficiencies.
Study Products
Briefing to SAF/OS & AF/CC in July 2014. Publish report in May 2015.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

USAF Scientific Advisory Board
Technology Readiness for Hypersonic Vehicles
Terms of Reference

Background
Recent successes with the X-51 Program and an increasing focus on access to denied airspace have renewed interest in pursuing hypersonic weapon systems. Previous studies identified as a shortfall the lack of the light-weight, high temperature, and high strength materials needed for such a vehicle, both on its aerodynamic surfaces and in its propulsion system. Additionally, recent hypersonic testing has experienced anomalies in propulsion flow-path predictability and flight control effectiveness. To evaluate the eventual military utility of air-breathing hypersonics technology, the Air Force needs to identify overall system concepts that provide that utility, develop confidence in the requisite materials, propulsion, and flight control technologies for the vehicle, address the sensors, communications, and other auxiliary sub-systems needed for the overall concept, and effectively integrate all those technologies.

Charter
The study will:
  • Identify the relevant operating regimes, in particular the flight speeds and altitudes, based on projected USAF concepts of operations for hypersonic systems including ISR and strike.
  • Examine overall system concepts for hypersonic weapon systems for those missions and flight regimes. Evaluate the military utility of those systems and identify technologies needed to achieve that utility. Compare the value of those systems to similar non-hypersonic systems.
  • Assess the maturity of the modeling and sub-system testing capabilities needed to understand the material and structural requirements, aerodynamic performance, propulsion, and control requirements for flight in the relevant operating regimes.
  • Evaluate existing and emerging materials, structural concepts, propulsion systems, flight control designs, sensors, communications systems, and operator control architectures to determine their readiness to enter a development program with a clear path to future military utility.
  • Assess existing test facilities and capabilities and highlight potential gaps which would impact system development.
  • Identify technology gaps and recommend R&D efforts to address those gaps including roadmaps and expected maturity timelines.
Study Products
Briefing to SAF/OS & AF/CC in July 2014. Publish report in May 2015.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

USAF Scientific Advisory Board
Technology Readiness for Hypersonic Vehicles
Terms of Reference

Background
All who serve our Nation as members of the United States Air Force deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. Sexual assault in any form is a crime that violates the bond of trust the Air Force owes its personnel. This study will review the scientific work on combating sexual assault and help the Air Force use that work to address the sexual assault problem.

Charter
This study will:
  • Review existing research literature on the nature of sexual assault, characteristics of both perpetrators and victims; causes for perpetrator behaviors; risk factors for victimization; patterns of abuse and victim selection; patterns related to victim and perpetrator demographics, including gender, ethnicity, rank, and Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC); and detection or prevention mechanisms.
  • Review existing data on sexual assault in the Air Force and compare its prevalence and nature with that in similar organizations and with its extent within the general population. Consider behavioral factors (e.g., prevalence of alcohol use), cultural factors, and organizational factors within the Air Force that may contribute to the problem or allow it to continue, or that may be leveraged to help reduce the problem. Examine other programs that have been used to create cultural and behavioral changes in the Air Force and their applicability to this problem.
  • Identify and review existing studies on how other organizations, groups, and companies have reduced the incidence of sexual assault to determine the efficacy of programs for prevention or remediation. Assess the validity of study findings and applicability to the Air Force problem.
  • Based on the above tasks, help the Air Force to identify potential abusers and defuse situations that might lead to assault by:
    • Enabling a better understanding of the time and resource commitment needed to make significant progress;
    • Identifying areas more likely to yield both short term and long term improvements, such as comparing actions affecting recruiting versus those addressing training or comparing ways to help potential victims versus means to identify potential predators; and
    • Providing recommendations for improved data collection, relevant metrics, and further research to be led by the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and other Air Force or Department of Defense organizations.
Study Products
Briefing to SAF/OS and AF/CC in June 2014. Publish report in August 2014.